A Class in the Guide, Chapter 71

youtube transcript cleaned up and translated by claude - more or less accurate

The following is a transcript of this class. Edited by ai and not reviewed in detail by me, but still worth reading imo.

If you follow along in video you have the text there, we are reading from where Maimonides begins to tell of his reading in the Kalaam and why he didn’t like their way, until where he begins to describe his own way.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Structure of the Chapter

1.1 Returning to the Subject

After a long break, we need to return to the matter and understand what is happening. The point is that we have Chapter 1, which is the introduction. This introductory chapter serves the entire section of chapters until the end of Part 1. Part 1 extends to the middle of Part 2, which in many ways provides the outline or framework within which Maimonides will work for about 36 chapters, until Chapter 31 of Part 2.

1.2 Structure of the Chapter

The chapter should be divided into two parts as I wrote here:

1. The first part is the general discussion, which can be called external, without entering into the essence of the direction of their proofs. It simply deals with their story, what we call their history, and from this attempts to explain why they are not the accepted wisdoms and why they are not wisdoms at all. This is the first part.

2. The second part still deals externally - it does not yet explain the basic assumptions of everything and their proofs for the existence of God and other requests he asks. But in the second part, he discusses the order of their proofs, from which direction they go, where they start from, and where they arrive. He will dispute their order, and within this dispute, his entire disagreement is embedded.

1.3 Transition Between Parts

The first part ended with a conclusion. He wrote, "The general principle," or "I tell you a general principle" - this is the last section, which is almost a literal translation. Some modern translators rendered it as "In summary," but it truly summarizes the main point he wanted to reach from the entire first part of the chapter. Now he will apply it somewhat, though not yet fully implement it, but rather tell us in a general way the order of their proofs and their methods. So this is the division of the chapter.

Chapter 2: Maimonides' Examination of the Kalam

2.1 Maimonides' Personal Narrative

Now he tells a story about himself. Just as this entire chapter is supposedly a historical narrative, here is a story about Maimonides: "And when I examined these books of the speakers as circumstances allowed me..." This could be translated as "as was possible for me." It depends on whether he intends to disparage his reading of these books. Some commentators like Rabbi Shem Tov and others claim that he actually means it seriously - that when he examined these books as was appropriate, meaning that everyone must also engage with these books. Or even that Maimonides does not hold these books in high regard, saying this is not wisdom.

It is not wise to disparage your opponent. It is not wise to say, "Maimonides already told me..." I don't know here, also the teachers of Maimonides, philosophy in general, already said that they are all nonsense, so there's no need to engage with them. But Maimonides actually found the time to examine the books of the speakers, and as he did, he compared them, saying, "just as I examined the books of the philosophers as well according to my ability." There is this "as well" that he always adds, saying, "another thing I did - I examined the books of the philosophers, and I also examined the books of the speakers."

He should have said it the other way around: "I examined the books of the philosophers..." He writes it in reverse here: "I examined the books of the speakers and also the books of the philosophers." There might be some wordplay here because he might be starting the issue that he actually needed to study only Torah books, but we don't have the tradition, so he examines both. But in truth, what he means to say is that one must examine both, and Maimonides truly excels in this by summarizing the ways of the Kalam very clearly, both in a way that explains why he disagrees with them but also in a way they would agree with.

2.2 Maimonides' Analysis of the Kalam Approach

It is a great art when someone can summarize and even simply repeat the method of someone he disagrees with in a way that the other party says, "Yes, you explained well what I'm saying," and then he begins to argue. Most people simply cannot do this. They think they understand what their opponents are saying, and when you repeat their statement and ask, "Did I say it well?" they never say, "Yes, you said exactly what I meant."

Maimonides, on one hand, wants to do this and succeeds quite well. There were indeed speakers who said that Maimonides' list of their assumptions, which he makes in Part 73, is a very good list of what they believe, very clear, and Maimonides organized it exceptionally well. Despite this, Maimonides claims that from this clarity, one can clearly see why he thinks it's nonsense. This is a great wisdom that he employs.

Chapter 3: The Methodology of the Kalam

3.1 The Single Approach of the Kalam

I examined their works and found that the way of all the speakers is a single kind, although that kind divides into parts. So I examined all the books - to say what I'm saying, one needs to examine many books. He claims, "I read many books, practically everything accessible to me at the library." It's possible he didn't have a very large library, but every book that came up, he would go through it.

There is a letter where Maimonides writes to Rabbi Ibn Tibbon that he received the commentaries of Ibn Rushd (Averroes), I think, on Aristotle, and says, "I haven't yet had time to go through them," but essentially one needs to go through every book. There were fewer nonsense books then, but Maimonides read even those, and he says, "I summarize for you: they all follow one way despite there being divisions within this kind."

3.2 Unity Among Differing Schools

This is the usage of "kind" - kind is a type of thing. They are all the same type despite having various differences. Someone who doesn't know how to examine sees differences, but someone a bit wiser says, "OK, they have something to say, but all these books say the same thing 1,000 or 20,000 times with small variations." There are some disputes within the tradition and so on, but ultimately it's all one approach.

So there aren't really so many books to read, and this is what Maimonides is going to tell us - that we don't need to read all the books because it's somewhat of a waste of time. They all agree, despite all the great divisions - there are real world wars between them - they all follow one way. This word "way" (derek in Hebrew, tariqa in Arabic) is very interesting here and should be noted. There is a way, a direction from where you start and where you arrive.

3.3 The Concept of "Way" or "Path"

The issue of proofs for existence that he's talking about here - these are a certain way. There is some way that starts from a certain place and arrives at a certain place, and this way could be other ways. As is known, Rabbi Aquinas has five ways to reach Allah (God), which are five proofs. These are paths, these are ways.

The definition of "way" is somewhat different from "proof." I emphasize this because if he had said, "They all have one proof" or something like that, "they are all based on one logic," that would be saying one thing, but to say they are "one way" is to say something slightly different because the way is also somewhat more in the framework, somewhat more external, as if there is a way how we... and this expresses that perhaps the argument is not just and not always about whether your proof is good or your argument is good. There is also some issue of the way that one chooses.

Chapter 4: Maimonides' Critique of the Kalam's Thinking

4.1 Two Foundational Problems with the Kalam

I have divided here two types of things that he says about the Kalam, which all of them agree on. All the Kalam are based on two things: one is their types of thinking, which is part of their way, and the second is what I called here the order of proofs, which is mainly what Maimonides calls here "way" - the direction from where they start and where they arrive in their proofs.

First, he discusses criticism that we've already seen and he will repeat many times. He has already said it several times, but now he says it as a summary of the Kalam method, that they truly agree with this themselves. This is not Maimonides saying it as slander against them; it's accepted.

The cornerstone of everything, the foundation, is that there is no criterion according to reality. We are the criterion for truth, not reality. The word here "criterion" (bechina) or sometimes written as "transfer" or something like that, means that what exists, what we see, is not the place from which we should take the criterion for what exists or what should exist or what can exist, meaning for the intellect.

4.2 Reality vs. Intellect in the Kalam

This is another way of saying that reality is not intelligible. Reality as we perceive it is not really perceivable; it is not really organized in an intellectual way, and one cannot learn anything from it. Why? Because one can intellectually conceive of its opposite. This is the great innovation, the great foundation of the Kalam according to Maimonides.

The epistemological or metaphilosophical foundation here is that reality is a custom. The fact that the world is in a certain way and works in a certain way - they say, "I can easily think of a world that works differently in a fundamental way," not just in small things that everyone can. Therefore, they claim that the world is not the criterion. One cannot take from it the criterion for what it is. What is the criterion is the intellect itself, not the world.

4.3 Confusion of Intellect and Imagination

This connects to the second foundation: they also in many places follow imagination and call it intellect. When they say, "It is possible in the intellect to conceive of its opposite," they actually mean imagination and not intellect. This is important for the point here that Maimonides will argue that one can imagine differently from reality, but one cannot think differently from reality.

Of course, as he himself says in the chapter, this definition is circular because the definer of intellect is reality. It's not that there is some thing called intellect that we impose on reality. This is exactly what he criticizes the Kalam for doing, that they don't impose it on reality because they say, "My intellect is broader than reality. I can imagine things that are not reality."

Maimonides says, "Very nice that you can imagine, but to intellectualize, you cannot, and you are simply mixing up the word intellect with the word imagination - these connections, these abilities."

Chapter 5: The Kalam's Order of Proofs

5.1 The Progression of Kalam Arguments

After laying out these foundations, which without them it truly doesn't work, he says, "When they presented their premises which you heard," they started with assumptions, as he said before but not in detail. Now he says they presented their premises which you heard, and "they ruled judgment and their proofs that the world is created."

So they reached from these assumptions to the verdict, this is a somewhat strange word for "they reached a conclusion," that the world is created. And when this was established, one step, we can say two steps: the step of the assumptions, and the step of "the world is created."

5.2 From Creation to God's Existence

The concept of the creation of the world - we still need to understand much more what these words mean. Where did this term "Beginning of the world" (Chidush Ha’olam) come from? Everyone knows it, but it comes only from Maimonides. Not Maimonides alone, but this entire philosophical tradition. In the Torah itself, "Chidush of the world" is not written. Many things are written; one can talk about the creation of the world, but "Beginning of the world" is a specific definition that needs to be understood.

In any case, "beginning" means it began in time. For now, that's the definition of it - it began at a certain time; it has a temporal beginning. And when it was established that the world is created, then we have this conclusion, and from this, we deduce the next conclusion: "It was established without doubt that it has a creator who created it."

This is, of course, "without doubt" - Maimonides seemingly admits that it is without doubt because a created thing, there is such a rule. One can argue with this rule, but they have a rule that they call intellectual, that a created thing needs something to create it. There are all kinds of divisions that were said to prove this, such as if it created itself, then it already existed. So someone else must create it. It cannot create itself, neither before it existed nor after it existed because it already exists. So a thing cannot create itself; this is supposedly the form of the proof, and therefore there is no doubt that a created thing has a creator.

5.3 Further Proofs Concerning God

One really needs to ask where we got this rule from. For someone who already criticizes the intellect, one must really ask him, "Who told you this?" Because this is not an intelligible rule; it's not a reality rule. And where did you get the intellect from? So there is some complication here, but Maimonides seemingly, I think only seemingly, agrees that if we reached the conclusion that the world is created, there is truly no doubt that it has a creator. This is the word that is used for this action of creating something.

After we have someone who creates the world, "they bring proofs that the creator is one," that there are not two creators, or perhaps that this one is not divided, which is again a kind of two. So this has to go in stages.

And then "they establish in that same one that it has no body." If it is only one, then it must be that it has no body, as Maimonides says they brought proofs here. He does not say that there is no doubt. We need to examine first of all whether these proofs themselves are good proofs - if there is a thing that creates the world, okay, that sounds reasonable at least, but to say that it must be one already sounds less reasonable. Maimonides himself will explain that there are problems with these arguments, and the third thing, that it has no body, I think is certainly not, at first thought, something that has a proof.

Chapter 6: Maimonides' Rejection of the Kalam Method

6.1 The Personal Reaction of Maimonides

And now we return to the main issue. Now he tells a story. He says, "And when I examined this way, my soul was greatly distanced from it." In Hebrew, one would say, "I abhorred this way," and rightfully so. I had a very great distancing, and not unjustifiably - "I was right in this." "I will explain to you why I am right in this."

This is a story that I recognize. There is a Jew who wanted to know that the Torah has proof, and he read all kinds of books that claimed to prove the Torah or the faith, and he did not enjoy them; he felt distant. And in fact, this is the experience of many people who also come out against the way of investigation because of this, saying, "I read a book of investigation, and my soul was greatly distanced from it, I distanced myself from God."

6.2 Why the Distancing is Justified

And Maimonides says here - I am interpreting somewhat - Maimonides says, "You were right to distance yourself from this." Why? It was appropriate that you distanced yourself from it. Not because the conclusion is that there are no good proofs, that simple faith is needed, or that there is no God, or that you did something wrong or something like that, but because why are you right in your distancing? Because "everything they think is a proof for the creation of the world" - and there are some lines here that I don't know why they achieved doubts, because there are many doubts - because all the proofs they brought are not good proofs, not good demonstrations. There are doubts.

I said there is something that has no doubt - there is no doubt that if there is a creation of the world, there is God, but that there is a creation of the world, there is doubt in this. And whoever read these proofs and did not become religious from them, but became less religious, was right. And Maimonides himself says, "I distanced myself, I abhor this way" - not simply because I don't like the creation of the world, because I have some difficulty accepting all kinds of implications of the creation of the world that Maimonides will say about miracles and all kinds of things - no, because I truly did not find good proofs here.

6.3 The Problem with Weak Proofs

Therefore, I think there is some argument here that whoever reads Maimonides will say this argument explicitly in the continuation, that this distances people. But there is also a kind of psychological argument that if you read proofs that don't work, you distance yourself from the matter. It's not that, okay, I have half a proof - no, first of all, there is an indication that this is not a good method at all, because those who claimed to bring proofs actually brought weak proofs. Weak proofs weaken the argument and do not strengthen it.

And there is also the issue of coming closer to God. Maimonides understands that to understand a good proof for the existence of God is to come closer to Him. There is no closeness and distance except in knowledge. And if someone led you to a weak proof, then you distance yourself from God and do not come closer to Him. This is a psychological action; it's psychological work. It's supposedly a sin.

So he says, "I read these books that claim to prove... I read 'The Gates of Unity' in 'Duties of the Hearts,' and I distanced myself. Why did I distance myself? Because it's not a good proof."

Chapter 7: The Problem with Proofs for Creation

7.1 Criteria for Valid Proofs

"And there is no false proof..." When I say that it's not a good proof, I'm using assumptions of logic that I learned, criteria that I received for a good proof. He does not detail them here, but he assumes a certain division that goes like this: "And there is no false proof but to one who doesn't know the difference between these three things: the proof, the dialectical argument, and rhetoric."

We went over this last time. In English, these are demonstrative proof, dialectical proof, and rhetorical proof. This is Aristotle's style. A demonstration is a true proof based on necessary premises and therefore also has a correct conclusion. Dialectical argument is something that if the premise is not correct, then it is valid, but its premise is not correct or not necessary, as Maimonides claims here.

As I said, if there is creation, then there is God, but who says there is creation? And rhetoric is something that appears like a proof but is not a proof. There are many types of rhetorical arguments. So this is the difference. And he says, there are many people indeed who have not read logic, and they don't understand, therefore they think there is a demonstration here. Okay, maybe they are fools, and maybe there are indeed people who also haven't studied logic and have some feeling that intuitively, they are smart enough to understand.

7.2 The Logic of Proofs

But for those who know the logical tools - tools for clarification - the matter is clear and revealed. This is not something that Maimonides argues with the conclusions. This needs to be well-understood here. He is not, at least not in this chapter, arguing with the conclusions. He is also not arguing with the creation of the world. He will say explicitly that he argues with the fact that this is a good proof, that their proofs are clear and revealed, that all their proofs have doubts.

Doubts means that the bringing of the proof itself is not good. You say if this, then that; I can think of an option that if this, then not that. And they took premises that were not demonstrative proof sometimes. You say, yes, if this, but you haven't proven that if this. So whoever knows the art of logic, the division between demonstration, dialectical argument, and rhetoric, knows that in general, these books do not prove what they intend to say.

7.3 The Distance from God Through Poor Proofs

Maimonides means to say that "Duties of the Hearts" does not prove the existence of God, and therefore whoever reads "The Gate of Unity" does not come closer to God; he distances himself. And Maimonides now enters into something that is not entirely his place here, as he says. He says, "Do you want to know if I, what about the creation of the world truly?" Okay, look, decide. And here he already says his conclusion, his opinion, his view.

He says, "And the conclusion..." This is a justification for the last sentence. His premises have no demonstration. He means the creation of the world - you cannot prove the existence of God from the creation of the world because the creation of the world is not necessary. And Maimonides says, "What do you mean, not necessary? I'll tell you briefly."

Chapter 8: Maimonides' Position on Creation vs. Eternity

8.1 The Limits of Religious Argument

"And the conclusion: the capability of the believers in the Torah" - religious people, the greatest that a religious person can do, no matter if he is Jewish or Christian (as Maimonides says, everyone agrees on the creation of the world) - "that they will nullify the demonstrations of the philosophers about eternity, and how noble this is when it is possible."

He says, "If only so." You claim that you have a proof for the creation of the world and therefore there is God. I tell you, look, meanwhile, I have proofs for the eternity of the world. If only you could nullify these proofs; I'm not yet talking about proving the creation of the world; I'm talking about saying that the proofs that the philosophers bring for the eternity of the world are not necessary proofs, and this is already a big enough request because supposedly they have demonstrations, not proofs as you think, good proofs.

8.2 The Unsolvable Question of Creation vs. Eternity

Therefore, Maimonides concludes, "It is already known to every clear-minded examiner who does not deceive himself, that this question" - I mean the eternity of the world or its creation - "will not reach it in a decisive demonstration, and that it's impossible." Here he means both sides, and I speak about this a lot. Here he promises, saying, "I'm still going to detail this for you."

He says the question of eternity has no demonstration, neither for this side nor for that side. This is important. This is already called "I have nullified the philosophical demonstrations" - not nullified them, but said that they are not necessary. He has not necessitated the opposite, so it could be that they are still somewhat good proofs, but indeed, this is a "standing" - standing means confusion. It's not written here "confusion"; a place where the intellect stands still. Maimonides wrote about this explicitly in other chapters. We don't have enough tools, enough knowledge, enough wisdom to reach a proof in this question, and therefore this is already, yes, needs to be understood.

8.3 The Impasse of Creation vs. Eternity

Maimonides also says that someone who is aware of the truth, both a Jew who acknowledges the truth, who believes in the creation of the world, needs to admit that he has no proof, and also a philosopher whose philosophical party believes in the eternity of the world needs to admit the truth that she has no proofs, that she has good considerations on both sides, but the demonstration is something else.

Maimonides says, "I will talk about this a lot, but I haven't spoken yet, so why should you believe me? So I'll give you a good enough reason to believe me. And it will suffice for you in this question, for now, until you haven't read all the arguments that the philosophers of the generations have disputed for 3,000 years."

The number 3,000 years is apparently intended from the time of Maimonides to the time of Abraham. And he says, "How do I know this? Until our times, this is in what is found in their compositions and their words." That is, Maimonides interprets, and he will say in the continuation, that Abraham said - I don't know how he reached this interpretation and who told him this, but Maimonides says Abraham said, "Called there in the name of God, the God of the world."

Chapter 9: The Philosophical Implications

9.1 The Historical Dialogue on Creation

"God of the world," Maimonides translates this as "Creator of heaven and earth." "God of the world" is like we say "Creator of the world." So Abraham innovated that He is the Creator of the world, but as is known, he argued with Nimrod, who was also a philosopher of the generations, and they argued. So yes, Abraham claimed this, okay, nice, so he claimed it, but why from this claim is there a discussion enough for you to understand that there is no proof here?

If there was a proof, as he says in the continuation, something that has a proof, no one disputes it. All of Rabbi Chasman's theories about people disagreeing even on things that have demonstrations - Maimonides does not agree with them, supposedly. Why? Because Maimonides claims that truly demonstrable things, everyone agrees on. Perhaps it takes time, perhaps the knowledge needs to be synchronized for everyone, I don't know, there are complicated things of course that no one knows, and therefore there are disputes and beliefs.

9.2 Disputes in Areas of Uncertainty

Maimonides claims that the space in which there is any dispute is the uncertain space. This is his very consistent method in all wisdom, in the entire Torah. Therefore, Maimonides really likes the issue of disputes. He says, yes, even in Halacha, he claims that if the knowledge was clear, there would be no disputes at all. And he is right in some sense. There is no dispute in clear things. Yes, there are biases; biases are good explanations for unclear things.

Maimonides also claims that people believe things because they have desires and things, but this doesn't work for clear enough things; it only works for unclear things. There might also be things that one needs to be wise to follow the argument, okay, but even here, if the argument is clear enough and good enough and based on premises that have no doubt, no one argues with it. If even the wise argue with them, then apparently there is no proof. This is a very nice argument of Maimonides.

9.3 Maimonides' Rare Position

The honesty of Maimonides in this chapter and in this entire approach is really rare. I don't think there is another Jew in the world who was so rare on both sides. There are other Jews who are more heretical than Maimonides, who say, "I have proof for the creation of the world," even those who are students of Maimonides, and they have all kinds of arguments that Maimonides hid and so on.

But this clarity of saying, first of all, even this persuasion, of saying if there were proofs, then all the Gentiles would already be Jews. Apparently, there aren't. If it's more reasonable that one should be Jewish, these are already good questions. Most things we need to decide on are not things that have good proofs, but to claim that there is proof, you are lying, you are deceiving yourself if you think there is sufficient proof.

One who is not wise, one who is wise, then okay, he enters; who is not wise, it is enough for him to remind himself that there are wise people who disagree on this for a long time, 3,000 years, and now it's already 4,000 years. People still have not decided on this question. This is a lot of “faith in the sages” (Emunas Chachamim) he has in all of these philosophers.

Chapter 10: Maimonides' Alternative Approach

10.1 The Problem with Using Creation as a Foundation

Maimonides does not agree with the argument of the "fear that we have examined" and some people who would just say “who cares what the Gentile Heretics have to say?” Okay, I don't know, I'm simply amazed because I really haven't found anyone who has the courage to say that I don't know. Not "I don't know" something that is a foundation of faith, not "I don't know" how many stars there are on the orbit of Venus or something, but here, here Maimonides, Maimonides doesn't remain in this skepticism.

That is, it's not that Maimonides is engaged in being skeptical. What he says is like this: "And after the matter, now we are not engaged, we need to remember, we are not engaged in the question of the creation of the world. Maimonides does not base the foundation of everything on the question of the creation of the world precisely because of this. But this is what he says now: "And after the matter in this question is thus," before we even enter to examine, I already examined, and I also tell you that it's not after all the examination, despite that I do actually have relatively good proofs according to his opinion, in the continuation he will say..."

"And nonetheless, since the matter is thus, how shall we take the premise and build upon it the existence of God? How do you dare to suggest that I take an unverified premise?" In other words, or as I translate to the language of the way, "How do you want me to stand on a shaky ladder in order to reach with it to the heavens? What will I do if it falls? It's already falling."

10.2 The Dilemma of God's Existence

"I cannot reach this way. I stand on the rungs of the ladder, and I fall. And what occurs here? The existence of God is in doubt." If the world is created, He has one, and if it is eternal, He doesn't have one. This is what all the theologians and all the speakers seemingly agree on. If the world is created, there is God - this is how they position themselves on this side, but they still say that there is doubt, "and if it is eternal, there is no God."

So Maimonides says, this is the reality. No one, there are those who lie, and I will explain to you how they lie in a moment, but this is the reality, and this is what pains him. He is not willing to agree that the existence of God should be in doubt, and therefore, so what will we do? We have only two options.

10.3 Two Options: Doubt or Force

If you know enough that you know there are Gentiles who don't agree, then you find that there is doubt, and therefore you are not approaching God, and therefore either you truly have doubt here, which is what we have to do, it's a dilemma, we don't know, or there is no doubt.

This is one option - after we know that there are disputes, there is an option that there is doubt. Another option, says Maimonides, and apparently this option is more popular than the first option, is "Or we will say that we've made a demonstration for the creation of the world." We will claim that we have a creation, that we have a proof, but we don't have a proof. So we have advice, well-known advice from all kinds of Muslims and even Jews.

Chapter 11: The Path to True Knowledge

11.1 The Problem of Certainty

What do they do if there is something we really need? Maimonides understands the need for certainty; he doesn't understand or agree with the need, or the excessive need, for certainty on the issue of the creation of the world, but certainty in the existence of God, he also wants. This is his whole issue. He says, "So what will we do? We will claim that because we don't know a way to reach God except through the creation of the world, we will claim, we will say that we've made a demonstration for the creation of the world."

And what will we do? "And we will force people by the power of the sword to accept from us, all so that we can say that we knew God by real demonstration." I don't know exactly what he will do; I know that he is thinking about all the kings who guard the religion that he mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.

11.2 The Need for Certainty About God

He says something like, "After all, we want, we need to approach God, we need not just for ourselves, perhaps also for the correction of society and so on, we need God, and we cannot have God in doubt. God in doubt is not God at all."

Creation of the world in doubt is fine; doubts in faith are fine, but God in doubt apparently needs to be understood why. Why Maimonides indeed makes this great concession. Sometimes I would present it as his decision to act - yes, in doubts, we have a doubt. We have two principles of faith, and Maimonides writes several times, also in this book, that the creation of the world is a foundation of the Torah of Moses. It's not that he thinks it's a small foundation that can be given up, like, say, in what year the Messiah will come, which doesn't matter, it's not important, it's okay, it is important, but between these two important things - the existence of the world and the creation of the world - Maimonides says, "I prefer that my readers not believe or doubt the creation of the world rather than doubt the existence of God."

11.3 Maimonides' Approach to God Without Creation

Therefore, if I were bringing proofs and going on the path to God through the creation of the world, then people would be in doubt about the existence of God, and this I do not agree with in any sense. So therefore, I go to God in the way of the eternity of the world, and what to do if one doesn't believe in the creation of the world? Okay, problem, we'll deal with it, but not such a big problem.

This is how I sometimes describe it. What appears to be written here is that there is something additional. Maimonides has some struggle with "we will force people by the power of the sword." Throughout the entire chapter, one can understand that there is something psychological, supposedly, that claims everyone needs a certain God.

I started to say maybe there is something deeper, that God is not something that tolerates doubts. A doubtful God is simply not God. That is, whoever says "I"—everyone knows that there is no big difference between a theist and an agnostic here. Yes, you are agnostic here; you behave in the same way as the theist exactly. You're a bit more honest; you don't claim that you know there is no God; you're not a liar; you say, "I don't know, maybe there is, maybe there isn't."

But this is essentially equivalent in terms of the fundamental decisions of life, in terms of the management of society, it is equivalent. Yes, and therefore agnosticism—to be in doubt about the existence of God—is not half a God; it's simply no God at all.

And it could be that this also fits with metaphysics, because the argument of Maimonides against the approach that goes from the creation of the world to God is also a metaphysical argument. Because Maimonides says, "You want to reach God through the world, I also reach God through the world, but through the uncertain part of the world." Let's say through the way the world is ordered.

And what's the problem with this? The problem is that you are placing the world before God, and the world is less strong than God metaphysically. In simple words, you cannot say "God through the world" precisely because, as we will see later in the second part of the chapter, the world is not as certain as God, at least.

Therefore, while it's true that there is no way to reach God except through the world, we must at least grasp the certain parts of the world, not the uncertain parts of the world. Because the truth, in the end, is that God is more certain than the world. This is how the understanding of God works.

Therefore, whoever thinks that there could be God's existence in doubt but the world's existence not in doubt—this is the claim of the people of creation who say "We know about the creation of the world, but about God?" This is backwards from the truth, which is that creation is in doubt and God is certain.

So this is something like that. The point is, since we need a world where God's existence is certain, why do we kill those who say there is no God? Maimonides thinks we need to do this, he rules this way. He doesn't rule—we need to note that he doesn't rule—that we need to kill someone who doesn't believe in the creation of the world. There are word games here, but he doesn't think this way, and he still explicitly says not to kill people who deny the Torah, because the Torah is less important than God.

Chapter 12: The Power of Coercion vs. Truth

12.1 Religion and Doubt

The issue is that when religion becomes truly uncertain, religion is when there is doubt. Religion is doubtful. And because the transmitters of religion, what he called the kings who guard religion, people of authority - we want the world to be religious - understand that doubtful religion doesn't work, and religion that has competitors doesn't work.

If I have a neighbor who doesn't believe in my God, who thinks it's all nonsense, or not the religion of my neighbor, my religion cannot survive like this. So he has only a simple piece of advice: to kill his neighbor. And what is the advantage? Now he can imagine that he has proof for the existence of God, because no one says otherwise.

12.2 Removing Disagreement by Force

Maimonides said, why do I have doubts in an external way? Because there are many wise people who say otherwise. Okay, I have advice: kill all the wise people. The advice of Nebuchadnezzar to kill all the wise people, and then there are no problems. What will Nebuchadnezzar gain by killing the wise people? Because if there are wise people, then he has a problem. If there is no dream, there are no solutions; there is nothing.

Similarly, one can kill whoever says otherwise, and then we can claim that we have proof. Maimonides says here, "So that we force people with the sword to accept the creation of the world so that we can say that we knew God by demonstration." If I read this line in the correct context, he is saying that people kill those who don't believe like them in particular things like the creation of the world because their belief in God depends on it, and they need to be able to lie to themselves and others that they know God by demonstration, because not knowing God by demonstration is not an option. Knowing God in doubt is not an option, and therefore only compulsion remains. If there is no persuasion, then compulsion is needed.

12.3 Maimonides' True Position

There is something else here that I'm not sure about. I'm not going to think that compulsion is needed. That's the problem - what I'm saying doesn't quite fit with this. Because maybe there really is doubt. I'm quite sure that Maimonides, if someone comes and says, "I read 'Guide for the Perplexed' and it came out to me that apparently there is no creation of the world," he will not punish him, saying, "You are liable to death." There is no doubt about this.

He didn't write such a book with this conclusion in a political sense; these are already other matters. Maimonides might claim - I think this fits completely - Maimonides would claim that in a world where everyone thinks that if there is no creation of the world, there is no God, one really needs to kill whoever denies the creation of the world. But after Maimonides did the great work of disconnecting these questions, now it's easy to believe in God without the creation of the world. So now there is no need to kill whoever doesn't believe in the creation of the world if the killing is for the correction of society; it's not some law that one has violated.

But here it seems that Maimonides is claiming that supposedly there are two options: either we prove things and we need to know things, or we kill whoever says otherwise, and then we can say what we want. And of course, in a philosophical book, Maimonides in this book does not use compulsion.

Chapter 13: Truth, Compulsion, and Alternative Paths

13.1 Methods of Enforcing Belief

I can say, yes, indeed in Chapter 51 where it was, yes, that he claimed that people who don't have good proofs, they shout and they frighten. They say, "If you don't believe, you will go to hell," which is also a kind of judgment of the sword. Whoever says, "If you don't believe, you will go to hell," is not doing a different action from someone who says, "You won't believe, I will kill you." Yes, one needs to note, he wants instead of saying that you will be convinced, he has some trick, I have a way. This is another way to God. There is a way that goes through proof, and if you don't have proof, then you have another way, which is compulsion.

You can force yourself too; deceive yourself too. If a thought comes into your mind that there is no God, then you will bang your head against the wall until the thought will go away. This is exactly the way of the sword. And all of this, now Maimonides concludes, "And all of this is far from the truth." This is not the way of truth. Of course, the truth is not compelled by the sword, and this entire way is not the way of truth. It could be that it is a necessary way sometimes; I don't know, but it is not the way of truth. On the right of God, this is the name of God in Islam, the true God.

13.2 Maimonides' True Path

So someone Muslim could translate it, and all of this is far from God. Now I will finish the way of Maimonides, and we will try to progress next week. But therefore, this way is not good, to summarize the way of which - the creation of the world to existence - is not good at all because the creation of the world is in doubt. This is the reason, and therefore God can be in doubt, and you have only the option to murder, but this is not an option; this is not the way of truth, and therefore this is far from truth. But what is truth?

I don't know exactly what's written, but "the true faces to me." It doesn't say here "the way"; there are modern translators who translate "the way," "the faces," or something, "the reality." I don't know exactly the connotation of the word. "The true way" - now I will teach you the true way, and one needs to note that he calls it, he doesn't just call it, all of this is something else.

13.3 The Philosophical Approach to God

I need to know exactly this word, but it's very interesting because the way of Maimonides is supposedly also not true. So there is some problem here, but let's understand. He says, "I will tell you a true way, and it is the way of demonstration that has no doubt" - not a way that has doubt - "and this is an opposite way, that will establish the existence of God" - that's one - "and His unity" - that's two - "and the removal of corporeality" - that's three - "and the ways of the philosophers."

I think that the way to God is a philosophical way, "whose ways are built on the eternity of the world." It's not only that they agree with the eternity of the world; they are built on the eternity of the world. We need to see how this comes out in calculation, but this is how it comes out - not that I believe in the eternity of the world or will accept from them, it's not only that I don't believe myself; I also supposedly don't admit. I admit for rhetorical purposes. So there is some problem here.

Chapter 14: The Philosophical Path and Its Implications

14.1 Proving God Without Deciding Creation vs. Eternity

"But because in this way, the demonstration will be verified and the complete truth will be reached in these three things, I mean in the existence of God and that He is one and that He is not corporeal, without deciding the judgment on the world if it is eternal or created." We are not going to decide the verdict if the world is created. We will leave the question, the question about the world, aside. First, we will reach God; after that, this is a way.

Therefore, I say this is a way; this is all a different order. Then when those three weighty, enormous requests come to us - the question of the creation of the world does not earn these descriptors here, "weighty," "enormous" - from a true servant, we will know the great requests, they are truly, we will return afterward to the creation of the world, and he does not say that we will know the creation of the world. "We will say in it whatever is possible to say in it." We will approach as much as we can know.

14.2 Alternative Views on Creation

And then what will we do regarding the creation of the world? "If so. And this judgment I don't understand," says Maimonides. "If you will be from those who are satisfied with what the speakers said, and you believe that they already demonstrated to you the creation of the world, I love this" - the translation here is certainly not good; I like this. It should say something like, "Good for you," could be that it's cynical. "You will have a good life. What, you didn't understand the word? What can I do? I don't know."

In the translation, he said, "I like this." What does that mean? "I like this." Now we've come out of a whole series of shouts against this way. What he means is something like this: after you receive from me the philosophical way to God, and afterward you also want to believe that you have a demonstration on the creation of the world, "to life and blessing." May it be for you in success, I don't know, something like this.

14.3 The Acceptance of Prophecy

"And if it will not be demonstrated to you with a demonstration" - if you will say that in fact, Maimonides, but take it from the prophets, from reception, "there is no damage in this." Take it, I said, "We don't have a demonstration neither for this side nor for that side, so we accept the prophets." Of course, we need a reason to accept the prophets; he will try to justify this in another second. "There is no damage in this." What does "there is no damage in this" mean? We need to note that there is damage in accepting the existence of God through reception from prophets. This damages because it is in doubt.

If we were going the opposite way, then it would damage. Yes, there is damage in the pursuit of this. It's not that the main thing is that in the end, you say "I believe" as is written in the book "Vision of Man." You need to know something, but if you don't know the creation of the world, says Maimonides, there's no problem. I don't think that it damages. That is, whoever says, "I am in doubt, I accept from the prophets" - but accepting from prophets, we need to note that the intention is "I don't know." I accept, I also need to justify this, but okay, it's not what's not so. This is important.

Chapter 15: Conclusion and Summary

15.1 The Difference in Approaches

What is not so is if we were going in the direction that the creation of the world proves the existence of God, then there would be damage in this because then the existence of God would be in doubt. If there is no doubt if you only accept from the prophets the creation of the world, and here Maimonides says, whoever accepts the existence of God from the prophets has damage; he is not close to God. Whoever accepts the creation of the world from the prophets, okay, it's not the most important thing, which is interesting because supposedly this is also what's written.

15.2 The Dilemma of Belief

And then now he remembers to justify the sides. Maimonides essentially establishes for us a dilemma whose two sides are that there is God. If there is a creation of the world, then there is God in a philosophical way; if there isn't, if there isn't, if there is a creation of the world, then there is God in a Kalam way. Indeed, okay. The main thing is that there is God on both sides of the dilemma.

15.3 Final Words and Transition

And you shall not say but there is a problem here. After all, someone can claim - I will reach more chapters, we will see that in this depend all kinds of confusions, the fundamental confusion of the "Guide for the Perplexed," and someone can claim, "What is this game? You say like this: if there is a creation of the world, okay, so there is God, I understand. If there is no creation of the world, that is, if we don't know, if there is no proof for the creation of the world, then what is there? A philosophical God, okay, and yes, and you will accept from the prophets that there is a creation of the world." And someone says, "What, I'm a philosopher, there are no prophets for you. You just said we are philosophers. Since when is there prophecy according to philosophy? Since when is there prophecy according to the eternity of the world?"

Maimonides says, "Yes. And you shall not say, how will you establish prophecy with the world eternal, until you hear our words on prophecy in this matter." He says, "And we are in this matter." He again pushes off the chapter. He says, "Yes, there is philosophical prophecy, and not only is there philosophical prophecy, this prophecy needs to be capable of transmitting things that are impossible to attain in philosophy." That is, the creation of the world, up to how much this game works, needs investigation.

But yes, "And after that, you believe in the creation of the world from the prophets and not from reception. And now, you believe in the creation of the world or not? If there is a creation of the world, then you already don't need this kind of prophecy, and then there isn't this kind of prophecy and the God of the philosopher. What is there? In any case, it has to come out like this despite that this is supposedly the problem because according to the creation of the world, there isn't this God, and there isn't this prophecy."

So we need to pay attention to the move, to the way that he is going here. Okay, I think, let's see if I went over but, let's finish. And after that, he is going to return once more and say his way, his way, meaning how is my proof for existence, how does it look, but as can be seen, I haven't divided it correctly here yet. So, "What is worthy that you know, that it should be known that the premises that the Kalam people used from their roots" - suddenly there are roots for them; I don't know what the word "roots" means. I think the intention is people engaged in, engaged in, engaged in theology or principles of faith, something like this - "wanted from the speakers to establish the creation of the world have in them an overturn of the world from changing the orders of creation which you will hear that it will be possible to contradict the mention to you of their premises from the objections to their proofs." He says, "I said to you that I like this whoever accepts the proofs for the creation of the world of these. I don't like this because there is a problem."

Afterwards, Maimonides says, is going to say that I also have certain proofs that are not better, but at least they don't have this problem of overturning the orders of creation. So this is important, and we need to understand why this so disturbs Maimonides, this issue of overturning the orders of creation, and what happens. Okay, so that is more or less what we understood today - the reason that the soul of Maimonides did not like the way of the speakers, and how he wants - he has not yet finished explaining the horns of his dilemma and how it comes out to him that there is God in any case. And this he is going to say in the next section, and we will try at least to say this next time, and see if it, if it works, and up to how much it works, and the holes that remain in this double game, we'll see.