Neoplatonic Virtues by Antonio Vargas Class 11 – 5/4/2025
Porphyry’s “Launching points to the intelligible”, or “Sentences”, Sentence 32
Summary of Plotinus On the Daimon
- Cosmological function of the virtue theory
- Adds Horizons of the scale of virtues not dealt with on virtue – becoming god, going to different heavenly spheres
- Role of the daimon in moral action – the higher standard we are always aspiring to.
Porphyry’s “Launching points to the intelligible”, or “Sentences”, Sentence 32
This will be a recap for Plotinus on daimon chapter 1-2
Porphyry doesn’t mention daimons here much, we will supplement this with other text. But will summarize chapter 1-2 of Plotinus’ text, in a more systemized manner. This will prefigure the full theory in Damascius.
He gives short general discussion of each, explains their place in the order, and explains the four cardinal virtues for each.
Intro to four levels of virtue
He gives the general four levels of virtue
1) The virtues of the human being at the "civic" level are one thing, (Republic virtues)
2) and those of the human being who is raising himself up towards the contemplative state and who is, for this reason, termed "contemplative;' are another. (Phaedo virtues – purification)
3) and different again are those of the human being who is already a perfected contemplative and who already practices contemplation, (the positive side of purification - turning toward nous)
4) and different yet again are those of the intellect, insofar as it is intellect and transcends (pure – katharos) soul. (in Plotinus – the models in intellect of virtues, what we imitate when acquiring virtues. Here it is also called virtue)
difference from Plotinus
- Plotinus wants to keep virtue as what the soul has, but for intellect doesn’t really want to call it “virtues”. Since that is something you acquire, but porphyry is comfortable talking about “the virtues of intellect”. Is this just semantics or is there a real difference between positions? We will see indications for the latter.
- Do these four steps conform to the divided line? Maybe not.
First level: civic virtues
Definition and Aim
He explains the civic virtues and why they are the lower -
The "civic" (political) virtues, based as they are on moderation of the passions, (Plotinus said these involve measuring our passions, bounding them by rules, these are Aristotle’s virtues. For example Not never being angry, but when to be angry – so these aare always tied to body and its passions in some sense) consist in following and going along with the process of reasoning (so not nous, lower level of reason) relative to our duty (a term important to stoic ethics, each person has their own duty and role, like father son soldier etc. ) in the field of practical action;
He explains why they are called “political”. Plotinus didn’t have an explanation of why these are called “political”. We remember In Phaedo Plato says this isn’t even real virtue, but in republic he says it is.
for this reason, since they have regard to a community of action that avoids doing harm to one's neighbors, they are called "civic' (politikos – having to do with the city, the polis) by reason of their concern with public association (really something like “herding together”. In the Statesman – which is the city person, the first definition is “herder of men”. Plato then rejects this because this would only apply to a divine ruler where he would provide all our needs.”) and community.
- This connects with the idea of each person doing their duty. Like each person doing his own thing which is definition of justice in the republic.
- Emphasis on “not harming”, it isn’t about perfecting the soul just leashing the passions so they don’t harm.
- “Public association and community” Maybe this distinction is connected with a class distinction, since the producers of the republic are only herded together, but only the ruling class really has “community” since they share everything. Plato explains this is to make sure they don’t rule in their own self-interest.
Four civic virtues
He explains the four civic virtues
They are as follows:
1) Practical wisdom (phronesis, contrasted to Sophia or nous, practical wisdom vs. theoretical) - relative to the reasoning element (not faculty for insight, but for giving and responding to reasons, articulating chains of thought) [in the soul] ;
2) courage -, relative to the spirited element;
3) moderation - which consists in the agreement and harmony of the affective element with the reason;
4) and justice - consisting, for each of the elements in the soul, in its performance of its proper role with respect to ruling and being ruled. (this is addition to Plato, that its role is also that it is ruled or rules, for example not just the spirited element doing what it does, but playing the correct political role – obeying reason and commanding appetite)
Second Level: the purificatory virtues
Definition and aim
now he explains the contemplative virtues and their place in the hierarchy of virtues -
The virtues, on the other hand, of the human being (in Greek – just “the one”. Really these are of the soul, not of the “man” – meaning soul with body) who is making progress towards the state of contemplation consist in detaching oneself from the things of this realm.
for this reason - these are also termed "purifications;' (Phaedo – “every virtue is a purification”) consisting in abstention from actions in concert with the body and from participating in the passions that affect it,
for - without doubt these virtues are those of a soul that is in the process of separating itself [from the body] in the direction of true being, whereas the civic virtues are concerned with the imposition of order (kathakosmosi – connected with beauty and the world, “ordering him to the way the world is ordered) on man in his mortal state –
Order of first two levels
He explains the order between civic and purification virtues, why civic are prerequisite to the second -
the civic virtues, we should specify, are precursors of the purifications,
for - it is only after one has been set in order in accordance with them that one can abstract oneself from performing any act in concert primarily with the body. (why? Acting out of passion is acting with the body as the dominant element. So if you want to separate and have the agent of your actions be the soul itself – so much more can’t you be driven by the passions).
- The lower classes of the republic needs only civic virtues, the next are for the philosophical class
- Question: seems like we can deny some civic virtues in the name of contemplative virtues? Like someone who says I don’t want to be a soldier because I don’t care about my state, not because I am bound to the body and fears etc.
- Maybe really the soldier cannot become a philosopher, since there is the class distinction, to already be caring about the world is great separation not of soldiers. Or maybe most people actually have this are just motivated by rage against their families etc.
- Hard to distinguish who has real moral courage and who is a coward using this as excuse. But moral courage is still political virtue, and we would need to decide what the correct political virtue is. The scale of virtues is only about the order between the entire orders of virtues, saying you already need to be moderate to purify yourself. So in either case you need the correct call in regard to civic virtue to be able to ascend to purification.
Four purificatory virtues
Now he explains the four virtues of the purificatory
For this reason, at the purificatory level,
1) practical wisdom - consists in the soul's not sharing any opinions with the body but acting on its own, and this is perfected by the pure exercise of the intellect.
- Not the intellect controlling body, but acting entirely separately
- Seems not very practical wisdom? You still need some practical wisdom, like to be able to avoid the distractions, like saying “this is the body not me”. And to be able to relate correctly, He gives practical advice soon, you might involuntary have pain or desire, but not voluntary.
- You still decide in regard to pain and pleasure, but don’t take them as any kind of good. Civic virtue – avoid pleasure now which will cause pain later (so pain is still the judge). Purificatory virtue – avoid pleasure since it isn’t important)
2) Moderation - is the result of taking care not to assent to any of the passions.
- Sort of the same as wisdom? Wisdom is cognitive, this is passions. The appetite hardly functions here)
3) courage - is not being afraid to depart from the body, as if one were falling into some void of not being.
- Again same action with different motivation, Socrates wasn’t afraid, was still in battle because a thought occurred to him.
- Civic courage – do whatever is good, even if it is death. Exchange disgrace for greater honor. More enduring honor or praise of reason is better.
- Purificatory courage – not afraid of death at all. Don’t care about honor at all. Since the soul will go on, (there is problem where there might not be good reason to die in civic world, but thumos and honors are for this, we promise them honors when they die etc.)
4) and justice - is the result of reason and intellect dominating the soul with nothing to oppose them.
- Purificatory justice is precisely in not seeing the parts of the soul as separate, this is the correct political constitution of the soul.
- In civic virtue the parts have a voice but are correctly ordered in the end. Here they have no voice at all. Just noise.
The purificatory virtues are more unified
- the political virtues relate to parts of the souls, but the purificatory don’t. republic has tripartite soul – this is because it is about the embodied soul. But Phaedo which is about the separate soul insists on the simplicity of the soul.
- This is why the virtues become more unified at this level
- Also connected to theory of unity of virtues.
Distinctions between civic and purificatory virtues
He gives general distinction between civic and purificatory virtues
2 distinctions, by the form of these virtues, and by their aim.
In brief,
the disposition characteristic of the civic virtues is to be seen
1) as the imposition of measure on the passions,
2) since it has as its aim living a human life in accordance with nature, (= human nature. Like Aristotle says about the function argument. As opposed to godly nature which is the next level. Also the continuance of community, reproduction. )
while the disposition that results from the contemplative virtues is manifested in-
1) total detachment from the passions,
2) which has as its aim assimilation to god.-
- plotinus started here, assimilation to god and escaping the world
- in tragedy, hercelus gives speech about enjoying passions because they will die, this is proper to mortal people. But plato says we shouldn’t just want to think mortal thoughts etc.
Third level: Positive Turning toward Nous
he introduces the third level, by splitting the meaning of purification
[first, we split the meaning of virtue, then the meaning of purification, then we will split the meaning of contemplation to get the fourth level]
1) purification is split to process and state
But since - "purification" can mean, as we know? (from where? The word has the 2 meanings?)
- in one sense, the process of purifying a soul
- and, in another, the state achieved by purified souls,
- the purificatory virtues can be viewed in accordance with either of these two meanings of "purification."
In fact, they both serve to purify the soul and are an accompaniment to the purified soul – (what made you pure is also included in the state of being pure)
for the aim of the process of purification is the state of purification –
2) purification is suppression of what is alien
but since the process of purification and the state of purity are, as is agreed, the suppression of all that is alien, - the good will be distinct from the purifying agent. (the one who is purifying themselves)
- the pure is “without alien things”
- The good is something positive,
- Process is a change, in process the being built and built isn’t at the same time, but in activity the know and having known is in the same time
3) Suppression of what is alien isn’t enough to become good – unless it itself is good
for if, in fact, what is purified were good before its loss of purity - purification alone would be sufficient;
but if purification is going to be sufficient - what remains after it will be the good, not the purification.
4) The soul isn’t by nature good
But the soul is not, as we know, by its nature good, but something that can participate in the good and is within the class of the good;
for otherwise it would not have come to be in an evil state.
- He rejects the explanation that you don’t do bad by your soul only because of body
- This is basically Augustine’s argument against the Manicheans, who said the above thing,
- We aren’t compelled into evil by our bodies, our soul is responsible also for the evil we do.
- We need something higher to explain that purification isn’t just for political virtue, only for the higher goal.
- The Christian argument seems to be that we cannot be good even in the civic sense of suppression of passions, without turning towards the higher, or that everyone should be a philosopher. Platonists don’t think everyone can be a philosopher.
5) The good is from above
The good for it, then, consists in uniting itself with what has engendered it,50 while evilies in uniting itself to what is inferior to it.
- Proof for this (from ET): good for a being is perfection, but it gets being from its cause, so perfection is in unifying to cause.
- While turning to inferior things is to things that can never give you being, so you will not proceed to get maximal being.